Angelo Raffaele Smimmo - September 2026

Europe’s Water Reserve. The Arctic in the Union’s New Strategy between Great Powers and Hydro-Climatic Security

1. Introduction

The Arctic has recently returned to the centre of the global geopolitical agenda. The militarisation of Russia’s northern flank, the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, American ambitions over Greenland and the consolidation of the Sino-Russian partnership have, within a few years, transformed a region once associated with Arctic exceptionalism into one of the main theatres of twenty-first-century strategic competition. The idea of the Arctic as a region immune to international tensions, governed through collective institutions driven by a spirit of cooperation, is now being called into question. The region is warming at nearly four times the global average,[1] progressively opening up both polar sea routes and the vast resources lying beneath its land and seabed. Experts in the field offer diverging interpretations of the effects of this transition. For some, exceptionalism has come to a definitive end, with the region now set to be energised and militarised.[2] For others, it is temporarily frozen, reduced to limited functional cooperation, from fisheries management in the Barents Sea to scientific research.[3] Competition does not originate in the Arctic but spills over into it from outside, as an extension of broader systemic crises, from the reshaping of the European security architecture to the foreign policy of the Trump administration and China’s global ambitions.[4]

Against this backdrop, the European Union is preparing to reformulate its Arctic policy. The public consultation launched by the European Commission in December 2025 closed on 16 March 2026, and the new Joint Communication is expected in autumn 2026.[5] The current document, dating from October 2021,[6] was conceived in a context that has since changed profoundly, so much so that the European Parliament has also recommended redefining it with a focus on security and defence, natural resources and energy, science and geopolitical cooperation.[7] This paper analyses the limits of the 2021 strategy in light of the changes that followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, examines Italy’s new Arctic policy of January 2026 as a possible reference for Brussels, maps the positioning of the region’s three main global actors and sets out a number of recommendations for the new European policy. Particular attention is paid to the water dimension of the Arctic question, too often treated as a climate externality rather than as a strategic factor in its own right. This approach draws on the one promoted by AB AQUA, which regards water not only as an environmental resource but also as a strategic factor of security and, at the same time, of dialogue and cooperation between states.[8]

2. The 2021 Joint Communication and its limits

The Joint Communication, entitled A stronger EU engagement for a peaceful, sustainable and prosperous Arctic, is the fourth guiding document of European Arctic policy, following those of 2008, 2012 and 2016. The Union’s engagement is structured around three pillars, namely peaceful cooperation and international dialogue, the fight against climate change and environmental threats, and the sustainable development of Arctic regions.

The most significant novelty compared with previous documents is the explicit recognition of the Union as a geopolitical actor with strategic interests in the region. For the first time, Brussels used the Green Deal as an instrument to legitimise its presence in the High North, announcing the opening of a Commission office in Nuuk, later inaugurated in March 2024, and proposed a multilateral agreement banning the development of new hydrocarbon reserves in the region, an ambitious position that nonetheless remained largely declaratory. However, the context in which that document was drafted has since changed substantially, particularly at the security, legal and institutional levels.

In the area of regional security, the Joint Communication, while acknowledging Russia’s military build-up, adopts a cautious tone that reflects the residual trust that characterised the EU’s relations with Moscow in 2021. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 rendered this approach obsolete. Since March of that year, the Arctic Council has been effectively paralysed at ministerial and diplomatic level, surviving only through working groups meeting in virtual format.[9] Moreover, the accession of Finland and Sweden to the Atlantic Alliance has redefined the strategic balance of the region, bringing seven of the eight Arctic states into NATO.

On the legal level, the advisory opinion on climate change, delivered unanimously by the International Court of Justice in July 2025, defined the applicable body of customary and treaty law and the consequences of breaches by states. In particular, the protection of the climate system is subject to clearly defined binding obligations. The obligation to prevent significant environmental harm has an erga omnes character, by virtue of which every state has a legal interest in invoking compliance with it.[10] Greenhouse gas emissions constitute pollution of the marine environment under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), as already held by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in 2024.[11] The end of Arctic exceptionalism is therefore also reflected in the normative sphere, regardless of discretionary political preferences.

On the institutional front, the recommendation adopted by the European Parliament on 26 November 2025, with 510 votes in favour, called on the Commission to formally abandon Arctic exceptionalism by integrating the region into the Union’s foreign, security and energy policies, establishing a dedicated Arctic unit within the European External Action Service and strengthening the mandate of the EU Special Envoy for the Arctic.[12]

Alongside these contextual changes, the 2021 strategy suffers from a particularly significant internal limitation. The document treats the thawing of permafrost and glaciers exclusively as a climate and environmental problem, and therefore as a consequence of warming to be monitored and mitigated. This framing may nonetheless prove incomplete, because it confines water to the domain of environmental policy, keeping it out of strategic and security policy. If, instead, it were recognised as an autonomous strategic resource, it would become an asset that generates interests, investment and competition, from Greenland’s hydropower potential to fish stocks migrating northwards and the hydrographic data of the new routes. Moving towards its broader recognition as a factor of European security entails adopting a new logic of risk assessment and planning that environmental protection alone does not provide. The link between cryosphere melt and the stability of the Atlantic circulation, as will be seen, is its most emblematic manifestation. Furthermore, this distinction determines which institutions should deal with it, with which instruments and with what priority. It is on this reclassification, analysed in detail below, that several of this paper’s recommendations rest.

3. Italy’s new 2026 Arctic policy

The need to respond to the changes under way in the Arctic region is not felt in Brussels alone. The document La Politica Artica Italiana. L’Italia e l’Artico: i valori della cooperazione in una regione in rapida trasformazione [Italy’s Arctic Policy. Italy and the Arctic: The Values of Cooperation in a Rapidly Changing Region], published in January 2026 jointly by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of University and Research, updates the 2015 national guidelines and defines Italy’s position in an area that the Italian Foreign Ministry describes as a ‘near-yet-distant neighbourhood’.[13] The strategy identifies several of the main issues addressed in the previous section. The crisis of the Arctic Council, Russian militarisation, the reinvigorated Sino-Russian partnership, the end of Nordic neutrality and the recent American position on Greenland are identified as factors requiring growing attention to the security dimension. The document is organised along five lines of action reflecting its inter-ministerial drafting, namely political and diplomatic engagement, security, scientific research, the economic dimension, and outreach and awareness.

Three elements make the Italian strategy particularly relevant from an EU perspective. The first is the recognition of the North-South axis from the Arctic to the Mediterranean as a constitutive dimension of European integration, linking Italy’s Arctic interest to the country’s Mediterranean vocation. The second is its explicit support for the revision of the 2021 Joint Communication. The third is its reference to the Horizon project LIQUIDICE, devoted to the impacts of cryosphere change on water resources, hydropower and local communities, which reflects a hydro-strategic awareness still absent at Union level. It should be noted that the strategy also has some limitations. On deterrence in particular, it maintains a cautious profile, favouring a supporting role in the short and medium term, an approach understandable for an observer state but one that ends up limiting its ambition.

4. The three major Arctic actors

Unlike Antarctica (classified as a global commons), the Arctic is an ocean surrounded by sovereign states. Five of them (Canada, Denmark through Greenland, Norway, Russia and the United States) exercise sovereign rights and jurisdiction in their respective exclusive economic zones and over their continental shelves. The progressive retreat of the sea ice, which the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) attributes beyond reasonable doubt to human influence,[14] is redrawing the region’s accessibility and, with it, the strategies and options of its main actors. Among the eight member states of the Arctic Council and its many observers, this paper focuses on three actors, namely Russia, the United States and China. They are not the only protagonists in the region, but on the one hand they are the only ones with the capacity to reshape its order, and on the other all three, each in its own way, are driving the erosion of Arctic exceptionalism. Russia does so from within, by militarising its northern flank; the United States from within the Western camp, by calling into question the territorial sovereignty of an ally such as Denmark; China from geographically outside, by showing that in today’s Arctic presence is built with capital, science and logistics before geography.

Russia

Russia remains the most geographically significant actor in the Arctic, as it controls roughly half of the total coastline and the entire length of the Northern Sea Route. Its main reference documents on the subject, the Fundamentals of State Policy in the Arctic to 2035 and the Strategy for the Development of the Arctic Zone, have been incorporated into the broader foreign policy concept adopted in 2023, which places the region among the country’s top national priorities.[15] In this context, the invasion of Ukraine has produced seemingly contradictory effects. Although Western sanctions have hit state finances, and in particular flagship energy projects such as Arctic LNG 2, federal funding for Arctic development has grown. The growing importance of the Arctic region for Russia is therefore evident, both because of its considerable strategic resource reserves and as a gateway to Asian markets. This centrality is also clear at the military level. Despite the difficulties encountered in its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has continued to invest substantial resources in consolidating its northern flank.[16] Water plays a significant role for Moscow, albeit one that follows an extractive logic. Russian documents cite the retreat of the sea ice and the transformation of the Siberian hydrological cycle as economic opportunities to be exploited, in clear tension with the obligations of states set out in the 2025 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice, whose breach would constitute internationally wrongful acts.

United States

The American position has undergone an unprecedented shift under the second Trump administration, culminating in the announcement at Davos in January 2026 of a future framework agreement on Greenland covering missile defence and mineral rights.[17] After the Cold War, Washington progressively disinvested from the Arctic region and today maintains a single space base at Pituffik and only three polar icebreakers, just one of which is heavy and over fifty years old, against a stated requirement of at least eight units.[18] Current American activism can partly be explained by this perception of accumulated delay. It can also be understood, to a significant extent, through the lens of critical raw materials. Greenland holds the world’s eighth-largest rare earth reserves and hosts, at Kvanefjeld and Tanbreez, two of the largest deposits on the planet, in addition to the aforementioned Pituffik base, an asset for missile warning on polar trajectories and for space surveillance.[19] Predictably, Copenhagen and Nuuk firmly rejected the framework agreement semi-imposed by the US presidency. Greenland stated that it would not consider any transfer of sovereignty and that, if forced to choose, it would remain with Denmark, the European Union and NATO.[20] Nevertheless, the most significant aspect remains that, for the first time, pressure on the Arctic order is coming from within the Western camp, to the point that some observers wonder whether the Arctic Council, chaired by the Kingdom of Denmark since May 2025, can survive the rift between Washington and Copenhagen.[21]

At the same time, the tension that has emerged between Washington and Ottawa offers further food for thought. President Trump’s repeated statements about Canada as a possible fifty-first American state, although they have remained rhetorical, have revived a long-standing friction. The United States has never recognised Canada’s position on the Northwest Passage, one of the main Arctic shipping routes. Canada, in fact, maintains that the Passage lies within its internal waters. The 1988 compromise merely froze the dispute on the basis of a relationship of mutual trust that the current administration no longer seems to regard as binding.[22] This US pressure may already have produced a tangible political effect, accelerating Ottawa’s rapprochement with the European Union, from the EU-Canada Security and Defence Partnership of June 2025 to the agreement on Canada’s participation in SAFE, signed in February 2026, and on to the proposal made in September 2026 by the President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, to begin work on welcoming Canada as the first associate member of the Union.[23]

China

The inclusion of China among the major Arctic actors requires some preliminary justification. Beijing has no presence on the Arctic coast, yet no extra-regional power has invested as much in the region. The reasons for this investment are geographical and structural. As a commercial superpower, Beijing depends on a few maritime chokepoints, such as Malacca and Suez, which nonetheless represent strategic vulnerabilities. The possibility of opening a new northern route that would cut transit times to Europe by a third and escape American naval projection matters to China in a way no Arctic state attaches it to. In addition, China now has a world-class polar scientific capacity, with an expanding fleet of research icebreakers providing both a legitimate means of access and a basis for presence. On this basis China described itself as a “near-Arctic state” in its January 2018 White Paper, framing its presence around the Polar Silk Road, an ambitious northern extension of the Belt and Road Initiative.[24] Unlike the other powers, Beijing advances neither territorial claims nor direct military projection, relying instead on investment, scientific research and multilateral cooperation. The real weight of this presence, however, is the subject of a debate that deserves to be presented in full. A first school of thought downplays its significance, since Sino-Russian naval cooperation remains essentially limited and joint development of the Northern Sea Route would have negligible military implications,[25] while some analysts wonder whether the Polar Silk Road is a long-term design or a strategy that has in fact run aground.[26] A second perspective instead points to a substantial acceleration, with new icebreakers equipped with autonomous underwater vehicles and dual-use surveillance activities,[27] and the resumption of joint marine research missions with Russia and projects for high ice-class container ships.[28] In this regard, the framework agreement signed with Russia in October 2025 would appear to mark a further step towards Moscow’s growing structural economic dependence on Beijing in response to mounting Western sanctions.[29]

5. The hydro-strategic dimension of the Arctic

Water is the most evident blind spot of the 2021 European strategy. The thawing of Arctic permafrost is altering the hydrological cycle on a continental scale, with an increase in Arctic river discharge estimated at between 17 and 25 per cent by the end of the century.[30] This major climatic transformation does not remain confined to the High North, since the growing inflow of freshwater into the North Atlantic weakens the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC), the mechanism that keeps Europe’s climate mild. The most recent simulations indicate that a collapse of the circulation would produce marked cooling and more intense cold extremes in north-western Europe, accompanied by reduced precipitation and more severe seasonal droughts across the continent, with the most pronounced changes around the Mediterranean basin.[31] The timing of a possible tipping point remains scientifically contested, but the relevance of the risk for long-term planning is now recognised. In 2025 Iceland classified the weakening of the AMOC as an existential threat to its security, the first case of formal securitisation of the link between Arctic water and climate stability by a state in the region.[32] Within this causal chain, the North-South axis from the Arctic to the Mediterranean proposed by the Italian strategy acquires strategic relevance, as the water security of southern Europe also depends on the fate of the northern cryosphere.

The hydro-strategic dimension of the Arctic presents two further relevant aspects that should be highlighted, of both an economic and a governance nature. First, Greenland has significant hydropower potential, already identified by European observers as an area for investment with immediate impact, for example to power data centres.[33] Second, freshwater, fisheries and the hydrography of the new Arctic routes are emerging as regional economic assets that European documents have so far failed to address with the necessary effectiveness. Governance aspects, for their part, show elements of cooperation that are still active. Research on the Arctic hydrological cycle is one of the few areas in which circumpolar scientific cooperation has survived the rupture of 2022, and it therefore represents a residual channel of dialogue that the Union has an interest in preserving.

The instruments to address these hydro-strategic aspects effectively already partly exist. In June 2025 the Commission adopted, one day apart, the Water Resilience Strategy and the European Ocean Pact. Taken together, the two documents cover the entire water cycle, from continental aquifers to marine governance. The Water Resilience Strategy, however, contains no reference to the Arctic and identifies its regional theatres as the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and Central Asia. The Ocean Pact mentions the region, but addresses it within the framework of maritime security and cooperation with like-minded Arctic states, without dealing with its hydrological transformation. One of the largest freshwater reserves on the planet, second only to Antarctica, is thus absent from the very documents that should govern it. The new Joint Communication can fill this gap by recognising the Arctic cryosphere as the continent’s water infrastructure and making hydro-climatic security one of its core pillars.[34]

6. Recommendations for the new European Arctic policy

The foregoing analysis makes it possible to formulate six recommendations for the Joint Communication expected by autumn 2026. The first two consolidate orientations that have already emerged in the European institutional debate, while the others focus on the need to integrate the hydro-strategic dimension into the Union’s Arctic policy.

I. Formally move beyond Arctic exceptionalism

The Union should acknowledge that the Arctic is no longer a region separate from global dynamics and integrate it fully into its foreign, security and economic policies, taking up Parliament’s call for a dedicated unit within the EEAS and a strengthened mandate for the Special Envoy. The advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice provides this choice with a strong legal foundation, framing the protection of the climate system as a common international obligation.

II. Treat security as a constitutive element

The security dimension must enter the strategy in full complementarity with NATO, with particular attention to hybrid threats and the protection of critical undersea and digital infrastructure in the High North.[35] The gap between the Union’s broad ambitions and its actual capabilities remains the crux of the matter. Without investment in satellite surveillance, icebreaking capacity and naval presence, as well as the essential prerequisite of a unified foreign policy, any EU action will remain largely declaratory and its impact severely limited.[36]

III. Build a hydro-strategic dimension

The melting of the Arctic’s freshwater reserve directly affects Europe’s climate and water availability. For this reason, the new Arctic policy should treat the ice of the North not only as an environmental problem but as a water reserve for the continent, to be understood and protected. In practical terms, this means linking Arctic policy to existing European strategies on water and oceans, strengthening the observation instruments the Union already has, from the Copernicus satellites to the ocean sensor networks that measure the Atlantic circulation, ensuring their continuity over time, and supporting research projects such as LIQUIDICE. Finally, science diplomacy in the Arctic is one of the few areas in which collaboration among Arctic countries has not been interrupted. For this reason, the Union has a specific interest in keeping this channel of communication open, using it as a diplomatic instrument to ensure continuity of dialogue even in times of tension, present and future.

IV. Define a position on Greenland

Decisions on the future of Greenland belong to the Greenlanders, and Danish sovereignty over the island is not in question. To genuinely uphold this principle, the Union should recognise Denmark’s importance as a frontline country and, accordingly, invest in projects that support the island’s economy. In this respect, water could be a key element. Greenland has enormous hydropower potential thanks to its rivers and glaciers, which could be used, for example, to power the data centres that Europe increasingly needs. Increasing investment in the region means, on the one hand, offering Greenlanders an alternative to the promises of other powers and, on the other, binding the government in Nuuk to Europe through an equal partnership.[37]

V. Manage critical raw materials with a systemic approach

The Arctic subsoil is rich in minerals essential to modern technologies, from batteries to wind turbines. As highlighted in particular by Mario Draghi’s recent report on competitiveness,[38] the Union must secure access to these resources. However, the EU’s modus operandi must not mirror that of its competitors, which extract without regard for the environment or local populations. The European approach should rest on agreements that guarantee high environmental standards and real benefits for the Greenlandic community. For the same reasons, relating both to the environment and to energy security, the proposal already put forward in 2021 to ban the opening of new oil and gas fields in the region should be confirmed.[39]

VI. Enhance the role of European observer states

The Arctic does not concern only the countries of the North. As highlighted earlier, observer states such as Italy can offer analysis and insights that help foster collaborative dialogue. One example is the Arctic Circle Forum, one of the main international events on the region, hosted by Italy in March 2026. Italy’s contribution rests, moreover, on a long-standing presence. Since 1997 the National Research Council has operated the Dirigibile Italia station in Svalbard, while the Italian Navy has for years conducted seabed and ocean survey campaigns in the High North. These are valuable skills for understanding how Arctic water is changing, what environmental and geopolitical risks follow from this and what opportunities can be seized. Finally, the Italian idea of an axis linking the Arctic to the Mediterranean helps explain to all Europeans, including those in the South, why what happens in the northern ice directly concerns their climate, their water and their security.

7. Conclusions

The European Union faces a historic choice. The 2021 Joint Communication, built on the principles of cooperative multilateralism and Arctic exceptionalism, has been overtaken by events. The war in Ukraine, Russian militarisation, reinvigorated Sino-Russian cooperation, American ambitions over Greenland and accelerating climate change demand a paradigm shift, for which the 2025 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice provides a legal as well as a political anchor. The six recommendations set out in this paper indicate a possible trajectory. First, moving beyond Arctic exceptionalism and treating security as a constitutive element pave the way for integrating the hydro-strategic dimension as a central factor of the new policy. Second, there is a need for a clear position on Greenland, based on respect for self-determination and on concrete investment. Third, a systemic approach to critical raw materials and the full engagement of European observer states, starting with Italy, are required.

The challenge facing Brussels is therefore closely tied to hydro-strategic issues. The Arctic is not only a region of shipping routes and raw materials, but one of the largest freshwater reserves on the planet, undergoing rapid transformation, whose fate is linked to that of European and Mediterranean water systems. The thesis of this paper is that Europe’s delay stems above all from the way Arctic water has been framed so far. As long as it remains classified solely as an environmental problem, the Union will continue to limit itself to mitigating its effects. Recognised instead as a strategic resource and a security factor, it will fully enter the remit of the Union’s foreign and security policy. However, recognising Arctic water as a strategic resource does not mean turning it into a further arena of contention. No actor is able to monitor the Arctic water balance on its own, which is also why scientific cooperation on the hydrological cycle has survived the crisis of the Arctic Council. This is the same logic that AB AQUA places at the heart of its thinking, according to which the shared management of water resources can turn a source of tension into a ground for cooperation.[40]

While Washington, Moscow and Beijing have already made their Arctic ambitions explicit, the Union has the opportunity, with the forthcoming Joint Communication, to do the same and to reaffirm its vision of the future in keeping with its own principles. A new Arctic policy that ignored the water dimension would once again be ill-suited to present realities and lagging behind history.

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[1] Mika Rantanen et al., “The Arctic Has Warmed Nearly Four Times Faster than the Globe since 1979”, Communications Earth & Environment 3, 168 (2022).

[2] Klaus Dodds and Mia Bennett, Unfrozen: The Fight for the Future of the Arctic, London, 2025.

[3] Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and The Arctic Institute, Restoring Arctic Exceptionalism: The Path Toward Sustainable Cooperation, Washington, DC, July 2025.

[4] Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Arctic Security: Power Shifts and Transformational Change, Cambridge, MA, 2026.

[5] European Commission, EU Arctic Policy: Call for Evidence and Public Consultation, Brussels, December 2025.

[6] European Commission and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, A Stronger EU Engagement for a Peaceful, Sustainable and Prosperous Arctic, Brussels, 2021.

[7] European Parliament, Recommendation on the EU’s Diplomatic Strategy and Geopolitical Cooperation in the Arctic, 2025.

[8] AB AQUA, Assisi 2025. L'acqua come strumento di dialogo e cooperazione tra i popoli. Un cambio di prospettiva per una convivenza pacifica [Assisi 2025. Water as an Instrument of Dialogue and Cooperation between Peoples. A Change of Perspective for Peaceful Coexistence], conference, Sacred Convent of Saint Francis, Assisi, 22 March 2025.

[9] David Balton and Stirling Haig, Revitalizing the Arctic Council, Belfer Center, Cambridge, MA, 24 February 2026.

[10] International Court of Justice, Obligations of States in respect of Climate Change, advisory opinion, 23 July 2025, esp. paras 439 ff.

[11] International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, advisory opinion no. 31, 2024.

[12] European Parliament, Recommendation, op. cit.

[13] Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, Ministry of Defence and Ministry of University and Research, La Politica Artica Italiana. L’Italia e l’Artico: i valori della cooperazione in una regione in rapida trasformazione [Italy’s Arctic Policy. Italy and the Arctic: The Values of Cooperation in a Rapidly Changing Region], Rome, 2026.

[14] IPCC, Climate Change 2023: Synthesis Report of the Sixth Assessment Report, Geneva, 2023.

[15] President of the Russian Federation, Foundations of State Policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the Period up to 2035 and Beyond, 2020; Russian Federation, The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, 2023.

[16] The Arctic Institute, Russia’s Arctic Military Posture in the Context of the War against Ukraine, Washington, DC, 2023.

[17] “Trump’s Push for Greenland Mineral Rights Could Block China’s Access to Rare Earths”, CNBC, 23 January 2026.

[18] Enrico Peschiera, "Gli Stati Uniti corrono ai ripari sulle rompighiaccio" [The United States Scrambles to Catch Up on Icebreakers], Osservatorio Artico, 15 July 2025, https://www.osservatorioartico.it/stati-uniti-corrono-ripari-rompighiaccio/.

[19] Center for Strategic and International Studies, Greenland, Rare Earths, and Arctic Security, Washington, DC, January 2026.

[20] “Climate Change Is a Greater Threat to Greenland than Trump’s Mineral Ambitions”, The World Today, Chatham House, London, March 2026.

[21] “Can the Arctic Council Survive the U.S.-Danish Rift Over Greenland?”, Foreign Policy, 16 April 2026.

[22] Justin Barnes, Explainer: The Northwest Passage's Shipping Potential, Legal Status, and What's at Stake, Belfer Center, Cambridge, MA, 28 July 2025.

[23] European Commission, 2026 State of the Union Address by President von der Leyen, SPEECH/26/1868, Strasbourg, 16 September 2026.

[24] State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s Arctic Policy (White Paper), Beijing, January 2018.

[25] “Russian and Chinese Threats to Greenland and the New Arctic Sea Routes Are Low”, Proceedings, U.S. Naval Institute, vol. 152, no. 1, January 2026.

[26] Erdem Lamazhapov, Iselin Stensdal and Gørild Heggelund, “China’s Polar Silk Road: Long Game or Failed Strategy?”, The Arctic Institute, 2023.

[27] Larissa Alves Lozano, Icebreakers of Influence: NATO and the Dual-Use China-Russia Arctic Threat, Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute, London, 2026.

[28] “China and Russia in the Arctic: From Friction to Deeper Ties”, London School of Economics, 2026.

[29] “How Chinese, Russian Arctic Ambitions Are Fueling a U.S. Polar Icebreaker Mission”, CNBC, 28 March 2026.

[30] Michael A. Rawlins and Ambarish V. Karmalkar, “Regime Shifts in Arctic Terrestrial Hydrology Manifested from Impacts of Climate Warming”, The Cryosphere, vol. 18, n. 3, 2024.

[31] René M. van Westen and Michiel L. J. Baatsen, “European Temperature Extremes under Different AMOC Scenarios in the Community Earth System Model”, Geophysical Research Letters, vol. 52, 2025.

[32] EPOC, AMOC Collapse: Separating Plausible Risk from Extreme Scenarios, 2026.

[33] European Council on Foreign Relations, Arctic Hold’em: Ten European Cards in Greenland, 2026.

[34] European Commission, EU Water Resilience Strategy, COM(2025), 2025; European Commission, European Ocean Pact, COM(2025), 2025.

[35] Gabriella Gricius, "Hybrid Attacks Rise on Undersea Cables in Baltic and Arctic Regions", Eurasia Daily Monitor, vol. 22, no. 14, 5 February 2025, https://jamestown.org/hybrid-attacks-rise-on-undersea-cables-in-baltic-and-arctic-regions/.

[36] Think Tank Europa, Europe’s Arctic Test: From Ambition to Capability, Copenhagen, 2026.

[37] European Council on Foreign Relations, Arctic Hold’em, op. cit.

[38] Mario Draghi, The Future of European Competitiveness. Part A: A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe (Brussels: European Commission, September 2024).

[39] International Institute for Sustainable Development, Submission to the EU Arctic Policy Consultation, 23 March 2026.

[40] AB AQUA, Assisi 2025, op. cit.