Chinese Hydro-Strategy in Latin America: The Argentine Case

Filippo Verre - January 22, 2024

* L’immagine di copertina di questo report è stata presa dal sito Shine, consultabile al seguente link: https://www.shine.cn/news/in-focus/2202182075/

For over a decade, China has been very effectively enhancing hydro-strategy as a foreign policy tool. This approach is part of the expansive context of Chinese diplomacy in providing capital and manpower to build strategic infrastructure projects. In fact, there are many projects in which Beijing allocates funding for the construction of ports, airports, bridges, roads and so on around the world. The main destination of Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is Africa, a continent that is nothing short of beloved given the potential growth represented by the lively Maghreb and sub-Saharan nations, where the rapidly growing demographic component plays a decisive role in terms of production potential. In addition to Africa, Asia is increasingly emerging as an area of ​​interest for Chinese FDI. Intuitively, the geographic proximity to some of the most vibrant economies in the world pushes China to focus on the construction of key infrastructures for the development and increase of traffic. It should also be noted that for some time now, another area has attracted Beijing's interest: Latin America.

From a qualitative research of the data, it is easy to identify how, in the space of a few years, the southern part of the American continent has attracted Chinese financial interests with ever greater vigor. From this perspective, the "leap forward", to use a metaphor dear to Chinese narrative, occurred between the first two decades of the 2000s. According to data from the Fundación para el Análisis y los Estudios Sociales - a private research body based in Madrid - if between 2001 and 2005 Chinese companies allocated approximately 4.4 billion dollars in Latin America, from 2011 to 2017 the investment rose to 70 billion. The increase was therefore nothing short of clear, especially if we consider that, again according to the Madrid institute, in the period from 2018 to 2022, Chinese FDI in this area further increased[1], despite the immobility caused by the pandemic. From Venezuela to Mexico, passing through Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, the Caribbean Islands (and others), Chinese financial flows and workers have contributed to the realization of many strategic mobility projects, among which airports, railways and bridges stand out.

This news, namely the increase in Chinese interest in Latin America and the construction of the aforementioned infrastructures, has been treated with adequate coverage by national and international researchers and analysts. In any case, in truth, Beijing's increased presence in an area of ​​the globe historically the preserve of its most current rival - the United States - has attracted the curiosity of many experts. Moreover, let us not forget the Monroe Doctrine (1823), according to which the American continent should not be subjected to external interference, at that time mainly of European origin. In the second half of the twentieth century, the Cuban Missile Crisis made it clear how this doctrine, although certainly antiquated, still represented a cornerstone of American foreign policy. Currently, although certainly more toned down than in the imperialist context of the early nineteenth century, the Monroe Doctrine remains unofficially present in the halls of power in Washington, where, inevitably, Chinese investments in Latin America have not gone unnoticed.

Beyond the purely numerical question regarding the volume of investments, it is interesting to understand the approach with which China has addressed itself towards Latin America. In fact, in addition to the "classic" strategic connection infrastructures, Beijing has clearly focused on the construction of large-scale water projects. Dams and hydroelectric plants, in particular, have been placed at the center of the development agenda that Beijing has in mind for numerous Andean nations, where water is abundant both in frozen form and by virtue of the many rivers. In South America, in fact, there are enormous masses of water due to numerous glaciers and vast river bodies that intersect like gigantic veins of water at all latitudes of this vast territory. It is no coincidence, therefore, that China has focused on this type of strategic infrastructure, since a wise exploitation of water allows to revolutionize both the energy production of a country and the supply of an indispensable resource for life in a socio-economic and productive perspective[2].

As mentioned, China is undoubtedly the global power that more than any other has inserted hydro-strategy as an arrow in its diplomatic quiver. In the past, AB AQUA has studied and explored various water projects in which the capital and companies of the Dragon have contributed to the construction of infrastructures of this type in many nations. Just think, for example, of Chinese activism in sub-Saharan Africa, where a large company of the caliber of Sinohydro Corporation – a true state colossus with tens of thousands of employees and administrative offices in almost all continents – has overseen the construction of extremely strategic water infrastructures in Nigeria and Uganda. Not only that, China has also invested heavily in Algeria, Georgia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, where several dams and hydroelectric plants have been built that are essential for the economic development of these countries. What has been happening for some time in Latin America and, in particular, in Argentina, fits precisely into this hydro-strategic groove on which Beijing has long been banking to increase its presence in numerous scenarios.

Argentina’s Economic Fragility Favors Strategic Partnership with Beijing

Argentina and China have very close economic and diplomatic relations, which have intensified significantly over the past decade. In 2022, among other things, the two countries celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of their diplomatic relations. This anniversary was characterized by a climate of strong friendship between the dignitaries and political leaders of both nations. On the evening of September 28, 2022, for example, Chinese President Xi Jinping spoke at the Foro de Alto Nivel sobre Intercambios Culturales China-Argentina, a bilateral event held in Beijing, where he expressed cordial words to describe the relationship between the two nations. He also expressed a message of good wishes, in the hope that it will be possible to foster the creation of a new chapter in the China-Argentina strategic partnership and contribute to the construction of a prosperous friendship between China and Latin America in view of a future of shared growth and stability. Likewise, in his letter of good wishes, Argentine President Alberto Fernández – in office since December 2019 – also expressed his hope that the two parties would increase their cooperation to foster economic and strategic proximity, contribute more to the well-being of their peoples, and to peace and global development.

Beyond the programmatic declarations made by their respective presidents and a general desire to collaborate together, what emerges from this important meeting between China and Argentina? Mainly, Beijing's willingness to invest in the fragile Argentine economy in the face of a constant supply of the abundant raw materials that Buenos Aires has. As is well known, the economic events that have characterized Argentina's recent economic decades have been problematic to say the least. Currently, the Andean nation, after a troubled relationship with international banking institutions, no longer has access to the funds that guaranteed a certain precarious stability, has a debt of over 40 billion dollars with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and appears close to exhausting its monetary reserves. According to some analyses[3], 36% of the population lives in poverty, exacerbated by a rapidly growing inflation rate that currently (August 2023) exceeds 100% on an annual basis. A situation of this type has inevitably pushed the Argentine leadership to seek new potential investors willing to bring in the financial capital that the country needs. China, in this respect, appears to be a reliable candidate, given the huge resources that are annually allocated by Beijing for the construction of works in places considered strategic.

How was it possible that Argentina, over time, alienated the economic support of international credit agencies and substantially reduced its credibility on global markets? The economic instability of this important Andean nation has unfortunately become chronic over the last few decades. Let us not forget, in this regard, that the economic system of Buenos Aires, between official defaults and unpaid debts, has technically failed at least nine times. A sad record. In a very brief and schematic way, also because it is not the subject of this discussion, we will try to retrace the main reasons that caused Argentina's decline in terms of production and finance and that indirectly favored the Chinese economic presence.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, Argentina was one of the richest countries in the world, with a GDP per capita comparable to important European powers such as France and Germany. However, the failure to modernise infrastructure and insufficient industrialisation – despite an abundance of raw materials, especially in relation to a small population – largely explain Argentina’s chronic economic difficulties, which it still suffers from today. Basically, Buenos Aires has never managed to become a competitive nation. The main reason for this is that Argentina has always had a hard time attracting foreign capital. In a capitalist economic system such as today’s, this factor has had a decisive impact.

One of the main culprits for this lack of attractiveness and openness to external funding has been identified by many observers as Juan Domingo Perón, whose government (which lasted from 1946 to 1955) hindered the influx of foreign resources in various ways. Perón, whose fascist and Francoist sympathies immediately alienated him from the diplomatic support of many Western nations, implemented a nationalist and statist programme with a strong social character. Immediately after his victory, he tried to favor the workers and the increase in power of the working class. In doing so, he was responsible for very drastic actions, including the nationalization of the Central Bank and the transportation system. Furthermore, he tried to obtain state control over all foreign entities operating in Argentina, essentially burying any investment opportunity in the country from abroad[4]. The dirigiste statism of the Perón government has in fact discouraged and distanced international investors over time, fearful that sooner or later the State would take control of the entire industrial system to their detriment.

Once the Peronist experience was over, the governments that followed one another starting from the second half of the 1950s dramatically increased the Argentine public debt in an attempt to favor industrial development. By repeatedly resorting to the Central Bank, which regularly printed money at the request of the government, Argentina gradually encountered the phenomenon of the so-called "monetization of the debt". Printing money “dopes” the national economy, which is in a fictitious state of expansion, and creates strong imbalances in a very short time, with a high probability of generating inflation. This is why, for example, the main market economies have long avoided resorting to Central Banks to deal with public debt and prefer to finance themselves on global markets. High inflation, as is known, causes enormous damage to the economy and society, generates uncertainty and is like a tax that affects all citizens, especially the weakest groups. This is exactly what happened in Argentina starting from the mid-sixties.

With the rise to power of Carlos Menem in 1989, after several decades of state dirigism, Argentina began a period of important economic reforms characterized by a more marked privatization. The Menem government (1989-1999), an expression of the so-called "federal Peronism", was characterized by the privatization of numerous state companies and by a harsh policy of economic austerity, whose objective was the radical cut in public spending in an attempt to reduce the large debt that had accumulated in previous years. A fundamental pillar of the economic discipline of Menem and his Minister of Finance - Domingo Cavallo - was the so-called ley de convertibilidad, a convertibility law that provided for the Argentine peso to have a fixed exchange rate with the US dollar. This decision was taken to prevent the value of the currency from fluctuating, anchoring it to the dollar in order to put a stop to the galloping inflation of the 1990s. These measures, while initially having good results by effectively curbing inflation, on the other hand greatly stiffened the Argentine economy, which found itself effectively modeled on the US economy by virtue of the ley de convertibilidad. Exports were not favored by an Argentine currency that suddenly became too strong for the value of Buenos Aires goods. In fact, the artificial rigidity of the exchange rate, which was greatly overvalued and did not truly reflect the economy of the Andean nation, made it much more difficult to export Buenos Aires products, which suddenly became much more expensive abroad. Furthermore, given the ease with which pesos could be converted into dollars, many citizens opted to use exclusively the US currency in their daily lives, thus also causing problems on the domestic economic front.

The Menem government, which had undertaken a bold reform path, was unable to reverse course. In fact, between the 1990s and 2000s, panic spread among Argentine citizens. Many artisans and professionals, fearing a sudden devaluation of the peso, converted their savings into dollars and transferred large sums abroad, with the certainty of being able to access their money at any time. In a desperate attempt to avoid bankruptcy and a massive outflow of capital, the Argentine government led by Fernando de la Rùa – in power from 10 December 1999 to 21 December 2001 – imposed a measure known as corralito[5], which froze all the bank accounts of Argentine citizens for a year, allowing only the withdrawal of small sums of money, generating social protests and harsh clashes[6]. And it was from that December 2001 that Argentina's troubled history with international credit agencies began, above all the IMF. After initially granting a loan in 2000, the IMF withdrew the allocated money in December 2001, effectively causing the first of a long series of defaults that have characterized Argentina's recent economic history.

Since then, very similar crises, albeit of lesser intensity, have cyclically recurred. The loans of the International Monetary Fund, which over time has tried to intervene by setting up financial recovery plans and economic reforms that were never truly respected, were not enough. A new default occurred in 2014 and, even more recently, in 2019 Argentina had again technically defaulted due to the failure to repay a loan that it had obtained in the meantime. Since then, attempts to stabilize the economy have been largely ineffective. The coronavirus pandemic that broke out in 2020, among other things, certainly did not help, on the contrary. The economy of Buenos Aires was affected more than many others by the crisis caused by the months of inactivity, and the country's GDP fell by more than 11%. In May 2020, the Andean nation again went into technical default due to the failure to repay other debts on time. Given the impossibility of financing itself on foreign markets, which is the main cause of Argentina's economic difficulties, the government began printing money again, causing a new increase in inflation, which ended up harming citizens and companies, which had already been in serious difficulty for some time.

Fig. 1: Proteste causate dalla misura passata alla storia con il nome di corralito https://brazilian.report/liveblog/coronavirus/2020/07/20/argentina-faces-worst-economic-crisis-since-the-2001-corralito/

It is precisely in this scenario of financial precariousness, chronic inflationary spirals and lack of concrete opportunities for recovery that China has entered, whose economic support is viewed with great favor in the halls of power in Buenos Aires. As briefly examined above, the difficult relationship with international credit agencies forces Argentina to seek other ways to finance the construction of strategic infrastructures, essential to promote trade and exchanges. To repay the influx of capital, the Andean country has made available its considerable natural resources, which are of absolute interest to an energy-hungry nation like China, always looking for new sources of supply to draw from to satisfy its powerful industrial machine.

The name of the country itself – Argentina – derives from the Latin “argentum”, a precious metal still very present in various mines today. In addition to silver, shale gas and oil are regularly extracted at various facilities, among which the Vaca Muerta site[7] in the province of Neuquén, in the southeast of the country, stands out. Despite being a very large deposit (36,000 km²), the lack of adequate infrastructure severely limits the extraction of fossil fuels that could be used to heat the homes of millions of citizens or exported to external markets[8]. In addition, it should be noted that Argentina is the third largest producer of lithium in the world, with significant production potential also for silicon and graphite. These materials, perhaps even more than oil and gas, are considered to be of absolute strategic interest for China, given their essential role in the production of cell phones, tablets, laptops and batteries for electric vehicles, goods produced in large quantities on Chinese territory.

Hydro-strategic collaboration between China and Argentina: the Santa Cruz River Hydroelectric Project

As mentioned above, the supply of capital that China is ready to offer to the government of Buenos Aires is not limited to the construction of infrastructure works in the “classic” sense, but has a precise hydro-strategic rationale. From this perspective, the Santa Cruz River Hydroelectric Project (SCRHP) represents an interesting case to study. The Rìo Santa Cruz is one of the most important glacial rivers in Argentina. It is almost 400 km long and originates from a glacial lake, Lago Argentino, a water basin geographically defined as “Patagonian” given its location in the mountains of southern Patagonia. With a drainage basin of almost 30,000 km², this river plays an essential role in conveying the pure mountain waters downstream, where they are used for irrigation purposes by many local communities and urban centers.

Plans for a massive hydroelectric complex on the Río Santa Cruz were first conceived in the 1950s, but only a series of preliminary studies in the 1980s laid the foundation for a more thorough analysis of its feasibility. In 2007, then-President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (in office from 2007 to 2015) relaunched plans for the construction of two dams, named Kirchner and Cepernic, in homage to former President Néstor Kirchner (and her late husband) and Jorge Cepernic, former governor of the province of Santa Cruz. The two dams are the Cóndor Cliff, capable of generating 950 MW of hydroelectric power, 70 m high, 130 km east of the city of El Calafate, in the Argentine province of Santa Cruz and the La Barrancosa dam, to be built about 170 km from the city of Comandante Luis Piedrabuena, also in the province of Santa Cruz. The latter will have a height of 45 m, and an installed capacity of 360 MW.

Once completed, the SCRHP is expected to generate 15% of Argentina's total hydroelectric production and 5% of the national electricity supply. It is therefore a hydro-energy complex that is nothing short of significant for the Andean nation. However, due to the scale of the construction operations, the project has been negatively received by locals and many environmental activists, who argue that it will have a negative impact on the culture, way of life and sacred lands of as many as 14 indigenous communities that live in the area. Furthermore, among the main critical issues highlighted in numerous studies, the SCRHP risks bringing to extinction the Macá tobiano, a water bird whose numbers have decreased by 80% in the last 25 years. In this regard, it is estimated that less than 800 individuals remain.

Fig. 2: Tobiano di Macá
https://www.gauchonews.it/societa-argentina/patagonia-maca-tobiano-estinzione/

What is China’s involvement in the Santa Cruz River Hydroelectric Project? Financial first and foremost. Put very bluntly, without Chinese capital, the SCRHP would not be feasible. In July 2014, during the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping to Argentina, the government of Buenos Aires signed an agreement with Beijing according to which China would open a line of credit for a total of 4.713 billion dollars, for the construction of the vast hydroelectric complex. Of this, 2.498 billion would come from the China Development Bank (CDB), 1.414 billion from the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) and 801 million dollars from the Bank of China.

Fig. 3: Simbolo della collaborazione sino-argentina

OIn addition to the purely financial aspect - undoubtedly of primary importance - China will carry out the construction work of the imposing structure through the China Energy Engineering Corporation (CEEC). Founded in September 2011, this large company is a conglomerate of energy engineering of considerable size and proven international level, with a well-known brand in the energy sector both in China and in the world. It is subject to the control of the "Commission for the supervision and administration of assets" owned by the Chinese State Council. This demonstrates a clear national strategic interest that Beijing has in companies operating in the water sector. In essence, therefore, China will provide both financial and technical support for what concerns the completion of the works.

The involvement of three Chinese credit institutions for the construction of the SCRHP is undoubtedly a strong signal of Beijing's commitment to supporting Argentina's hydro-strategic development plans. As partially reported above, China has long been using investment banks as alternatives to the more traditional international credit agencies to finance large-scale projects around the world. In this regard, it is worth remembering the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a significant financial center created in 2014 whose main objective is to increase the Dragon's financial presence in Asia (but not only). Again, think of the New Development Bank BRICS (NDB BRICS), founded in 2014 with the ambitious project of financially "detaching" the economies of emerging countries from the IMF and the World Bank, two traditional financial centers in which the Western presence has long been considered overwhelming and oppressive by the Chinese leadership, little inclined to submit to a system of power now considered obsolete and anachronistic. The headquarters of the two new banks, Beijing and Shanghai respectively, is a clear signal of how China is placing itself at the center of the international financial scene, challenging in a not so veiled way the economic order resulting from the Bretton Woods Agreements, signed in the now distant – according to Beijing – July 1944. In this regard, it is interesting to note that Buenos Aires will be one of the new members – together with Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates – to officially join the BRICS starting from January 1, 2024.

As far as Argentina is concerned, the possibility of counting on alternative methods of financing – as previously mentioned – represents perhaps the only alternative to a chronic stagnation alternating with inflationary phenomena and bankruptcies. This is why, from this perspective, Chinese involvement in an extremely strategic sector such as hydro-energy has been repeatedly favored by the leadership of Buenos Aires. From a financial perspective, Beijing's role is crucial, since 100% of the infrastructure is financed by Chinese capital. From an operational perspective, Argentina motivated the awarding of the contract to CEEC by virtue of the technical reliability of the company. And in fact, according to the available data, CEEC oversees infrastructure development projects in various parts of the world and has a portfolio that is nothing short of significant. At the end of 2021, the Chinese state company had signed contracts worth approximately 217 billion Yuan, equal to approximately 32 billion dollars, with an increase of 21% compared to 2020[9]. In reality, despite the undoubted reliability of the company in question, the modus operandi usually adopted by Beijing in these matters provides that in addition to the capital, the technicians, engineers, projects and workers are the exclusive prerogative of China. This working methodology inevitably leaves little room for collaboration with other entities and substantially “cannibalizes” the market to the exclusive advantage of China.

The SCRHP is presented by the parties involved – Beijing and Buenos Aires – as a project characterized by the so-called win-win output. On paper, in fact, there would be multiple advantages that the Chinese infrastructure would bring both in terms of energy and in terms of the supply of electricity and work for numerous families living near the complex. For its part, China would secure a valid ally in a strategic geographic quadrant and could take advantage of the aforementioned abundant raw materials that Argentina has. In reality, examining the issue carefully, it appears evident that, in the face of the creation of an infrastructure that is undoubtedly useful for Buenos Aires, the main beneficiary is China. Chinese capital will be used to employ a Chinese company that, in turn, will make use of technicians, workers and engineers not found locally but brought directly from the factories and universities of the Dragon. Argentina will undoubtedly obtain a benefit in terms of modernization in a key sector such as energy but, concretely, the real beneficiary of the project will be China. In Argentina this aspect is very clear and it is certainly no coincidence that, in this regard, numerous "anti-dam" committees have arisen that are trying to limit construction operations as much as possible with the aim of interrupting them. This is certainly not an easy mission, since Buenos Aires has a strong need for foreign capital to modernize some sectors of its economy and China is very determined to provide the support that Argentina needs.

Conclusion

Chinese hydro-strategy in Latin America represents an important piece of Beijing's foreign policy. Water has long assumed a central value in Chinese diplomacy and strategy. The capital and workforce mobilized suggest a proven methodology that is replicated in various nations and continents with the specific aim of increasing the presence of the Dragon in politics, economics and local society. Let us not forget, in fact, that water infrastructures have, more than other "classic" strategic infrastructures, a significant impact on society and the territory where they are built. In fact, if a bridge or a road contribute "only" to improving trade and traffic, a dam or a hydroelectric plant bring about a profound change that is difficult to compare to "simple" connection works. A dam can have an impact in resolving drought crises by regulating the flow of water; it can prevent floods by limiting, when necessary, the volume of water flowing downstream; if equipped with a hydroelectric plant, the dam in question can be used to provide totally renewable electricity to a considerable number of people. In short, the control of the water flow guaranteed by a large dam – as in the Argentine case discussed in this report – can be decisive for the development of an entire geographical area under many profiles.

China's involvement in the construction of the SCRHP represents an important case study. In the face of an undoubtedly substantial investment, Beijing aims to become a strategic partner for Argentina not only from an economic point of view but also in terms of energy development in a key sector such as water. There has certainly been no shortage of critical issues in this project. In addition to the aforementioned criticisms regarding the lack of respect for sacred lands for some Native American communities, there are environmental issues that have led various Argentine courts to rule negatively on the final feasibility of the infrastructure. In December 2016, in particular, the Supreme Court of Argentina issued a precautionary measure suspending construction work due to a negative Environmental Impact Assessment. According to the court, the project was not in line with the Law on the Environmental Impact of Hydraulic Works in force in Argentina. This ruling was also brought to Parliament in 2017 by environmentalist politicians to discourage the government of Buenos Aires from continuing with this project. Again, some problems were also encountered during Covid 19, with repeated reports of Chinese workers who did not respect anti-contagion measures. However, despite some obvious problems – which in truth always occur in this type of mega project – the construction of the SCRHP went ahead, a tangible sign of how much Beijing is intent on expanding in an area of ​​the world historically the preserve of its US rivals.

Bibliografia

• Articolo di Redazione, I guai dell’Argentina non si risolvono con i Mondiali, “Il Post”, pubblicato il 13 dicembre 2022.

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• Samartín M., Cardone C., Bustamante R., Was the Argentine corralito an efficient measure?, in ”International Review of Economics & Finance”, Vol. 16, Issue 3, pp. 444 – 453, 2007.

• Verre F., La crisi idrica di Chennai (2019). Un’emergenza nazionale indiana, in “AB AQUA – Centro Studi Idrostrategici”, pubblicato il 7 dicembre 2022.

• Xin Z., Argentina benefits from Energy China hydropower, in “China Daily”, pubblicato il 20 giugno 2022.

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[1] Rossana Miranda, Muraglie cinesi, tutte le infrastrutture di Xi Jinping in America latina, in “Formiche”, pubblicato il 31 gennaio 2023.

[2] L’acqua, come si può facilmente intuire anche se spesso non se ne ha una piena contezza, entra pressoché in ogni processo produttivo a carattere industriale. Una maggior fornitura d’acqua può indirettamente incrementare la produzione di un territorio, così come, viceversa, una crisi idrica rappresenta un’interruzione repentina della crescita industriale. Per maggiori dettagli al riguardo, in particolare su un caso importante di crisi idrica che abbiamo già trattato in passato, si rimanda a Filippo Verre, La crisi idrica di Chennai (2019). Un’emergenza nazionale indiana, in “AB AQUA – Centro Studi Idrostrategici”, pubblicato il 7 dicembre 2022.

[3] Emmanuelle Mansart-Monat, Argentina: inflación descontrolada e incertidumbre económica, in “The Conversation”, pubblicato il 26 febbraio 2023.

[4] Articolo di Redazione, I guai dell’Argentina non si risolvono con i Mondiali, “Il Post”, pubblicato il 13 dicembre 2022.

[5] Margarita Samartín, Clara Cardone, Rodrigo Bustamante, Was the Argentine corralito an efficient measure?, in ”International Review of Economics & Finance”, Vol. 16, Issue 3, pp. 444 – 453, 2007.

[6] L’economia, che era già in recessione dal 1998, nel 2002 si contrasse dell’11% e il tasso di disoccupazione aumentò dal 14,8 al 22,5%. I cittadini che vivevano al di sotto della soglia di povertà aumentarono e arrivarono al 57,5% della popolazione nel 2002. Silvia Del Rizzo e Chiara Mingolla, Argentina di nuovo sull’orlo del fallimento, in “La Voce”, pubblicato il 16 maggio 2023.

[7] Il giacimento di Vaca Muerta, letteralmente «vacca morta», è stato scoperto nel 1931 dal geologo americano Charles Edwin Weaver. La sua curiosa denominazione deriva dalla forma, che ricorda la sagoma di una mucca sdraiata.

[8] Filippo Merli, Argentina a tutto (shale) gas, in “Italia Oggi”, pubblicato il 19 ottobre 2022.

[9] Zheng Xin, Argentina benefits from Energy China hydropower, in “China Daily”, pubblicato il 20 giugno 2022.